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The notion of “bounded rationality” was introduced by Simon as an appropriate framework for explaining how agents reason and make decisions in accordance with their computational limitations and the characteristics of the environments in which they exist (seen metaphorically as two complementary scissor blades).We elaborate on how bounded rationality is usually conceived in psychology and on its relationship with logic. We focus on the relationship between heuristics and some non-monotonic logical systems. These two categories of cognitive tools share fundamental features. As a step further, we show that in some cases heuristics themselves can be formalized from this logic perspective. We have therefore two main aims: on the one hand, to demonstrate the relationship between the bounded rationality programme and logic, understood in a broad sense; on the other hand, to provide logical tools of analysis of already known heuristics. This may lead to results such as the characterization of fast and frugal binary trees in terms of their associated logic program here provided.
This thesis presents the results of a series of studies (on syllogisms, on the interpretation of mathematical statements and on probabilistic thinking) conducted with the idea that different, legitimate kinds of reasoning are used by humans in a contextual way, and that therefore no single logic (e.g., classical logic) can be expected to account for this diversity.
The crucial role of interpretation is highlighted, showing how intensional and extensional reasoning may be mobilized according to it. In particular, in communication settings, this depends on our adoption of a cooperative, credulous disposition, or on the contrary, of an adversarial, sceptical one.
In reasoning about mathematics in an educational setting, students (and teachers) may be enrolled in a back and forth between believing, doubting, making sense, giving arguments and proving. These changes in dispositions imply changes in the logics used. All the studies presented show, in different ways, evidence for cooperative, intensional reasoning and, in some cases, the possibility of a shift towards the acquisition of an extensional view. This suggest that if we expect as educators the adoption of specific norms and the development of reasoning skills from students, we need first to know well what the point of departure is where they are, and that it is often not at all “irrational”.